This paper seeks to gain insights on the relationship between growth and unemployment, when considering heterogeneous agents in terms of age. We introduce in the endogenous job destruction frameworkà la Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) life cycle features. We show that, under the assumption of homogeneous productivity among workers, firms tend to fire more often older workers rather than young ones, when deciding whether to update or not a technology: there is an equilibrium where the creative destruction effect dominates over the capitalization effect for old workers, whereas the capitalization effect dominates for young workers. This discrimination against older workers can be moderated when we introduce heterogeneity (in terms of productivity) among workers. We also provide empirical support to these theoretical findings using OECD panel data set and numerical simulations of the model.
Introduction
The relationship between growth and unemployment has been largely analyzed by the economic literature. In his seminal work, Pissarides (1990) claims that an acceleration of growth improves the employment rate, because growth increases "freely", as in the Solow model, the expected profits and provides then incentives to open new jobs (the capitalization effect). In contrast, Aghion and Howitt (1994) argue that growth fosters a "creative destruction" process inducing more job destruction and less job creation, yielding higher unemployment rates. What effect (creative destruction vs. capitalization) prevails in case of acceleration in the growth rate? As remarked by Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) , if the cost of adopting the new more productive technology in an already existing job is higher than the cost of creating of a new job, growth leads to creative destruction (more unemployment). Conversely, if the updating cost is below the creation cost, growth can lead to capitalization (less unemployment).
Even if from a theoretical point of view the link between growth and employment is ambiguous, empirical works report more clear results. Using a traditional econometric approach, i.e. a panel of OECD countries, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) or Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) show that an increase in growth pushes down unemployment. Similarly, using several measures of co-movements in the frequency domain, Tripier (2007) shows that the long-run co-movement between unemployment and productivity is strongly negative, in the US and Europe. Moreover, the simultaneous slowdown in productivity growth and the rise in the unemployment rate in OECD countries supports the view of a positive correlation between these two phenomena. The empirical evidence suggests then that the capitalization effect of growth overcomes the creative destruction effect, leading to a decrease in the long term aggregate unemployment rate. Does this mean that Aghion and Howitt (1994) were wrong when claiming that an acceleration of growth is associated with a creative destruction effect leading to a rise in unemployment rates?
We believe the answer is negative as soon as we consider heterogeneous agents.
In this paper, we show that the relative magnitude of the capitalization and the creative destruction effects depends on the age of the worker. Our idea is supported by US data. Figure   1 displays the relationship between the growth rate of the TFP (total factor productivity) and the relative employment rate of young and old workers (we will consider as young workers those having still ten years before retirement) in the US. We observe that the relative employment rate of 25-54 years old workers in the US follows exactly the same path as the TFP growth rate.
Moreover, the structural break suffered by the TFP growth in the second half of the nineties is exactly reproduced by the relative employment rate. In contrast, the relative employment rate of the US 55-64 years old workers follows an inverse path with respect to that of TFP growth, with a decreasing trend until the mid-nineties and an upward trend afterwards. The effect of growth on employment seems then to evolve along the life cycle, since it has a positive effect during the youth period and a negative effect when approaching to retirement. Using an OECD database (see Bassanini and Duval (2006) ) we propose a more formal econometric tests of this assumption. Econometric estimates are reported in table 1. The employment rate of young workers increases with TFP growth rate whereas that of old workers decreases. Young employment rates display an elasticity with respect to growth equal to 0.88 whereas that of old workers equals -3.25.
In these regressions, we control for labor market institutions 1 , for business cycle, for the degree of product market regulation 2 , for the terms of trade shock 3 , for the real interest rate shock 4 , for the labor demand shocks 5 , for time specific effects and for country specific heterogeneity. 1 We choose the traditional indicators of the labor market institutions: the average replacement rate, the tax wedge, the employment protection on regular contract, the union density and an indicator of the union coverage.
2 OECD summary indicator of regulatory impediments to product market competition in seven nonmanufacturing industries.
3 Logarithm of the relative price of imports weighted by the share of imports in GDP. 4 Difference between the 10-year nominal government bond yield (in %) and the annual change in the GDP deflator (in %). 5 Logarithm of the labor share in business sector GDP purged from the short-run influence of factor prices. Period: 1982 Period: -2003 Data set Bassanini and Duval [2007] .
Most labor market institutions are significant and display the expected sign. More precisely, high taxes, a high replacement ratio or an important union density negatively influence the employment rate of both, young and old workers (union density arises as non significant for old workers). In contrast, the effect of employment protection is negative for young workers and positive for old ones. In the regression of older workers, we also control for the heterogeneity arising from country specific Social Security rules (the implicit tax on continued activity, SS tax, and the normal retirement age). Our estimations reveal that the employment rate of old workers increases with the normal retirement age and decreases with the social security tax (see Gruber and Wise (1998) and Hairault, Langot and Sopraseuth (2008) ).
How can we relate this stylized fact to the labor demand decision arising from firms? When a worker is young, the time horizon during which a firm can recoup the updating cost allowing to renovate an existing technology is longer than for a senior. Then, the optimal policy for the firm is to renovate frequently jobs occupied by young workers whereas separation is the best choice if the job is occupied by an old worker. In this scenario, the capitalization effect can explain the positive relation between the employment rate of young workers and growth, whereas the creative destruction effect explains the low employment rate of older workers.
The effect of growth on the employment rate of heterogeneous agents has traditionally been analyzed using theoretical or empirical frameworks where the source of heterogeneity arises from the individuals' skill level (see for example Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994), Machin and Van Reenen (1998) or Moreno-Galbis and Sneessens (2007) ). However, to our knowledge, there are few studies analyzing whether a given individual is equally exposed to the consequences of growth along her life-cycle 6 . Our paper focuses on this issue. More precisely we analyze the conditions under which the acceleration of growth fostered by the diffusion of technological progress is systematically biased against old workers. Our intuition is that the shorter horizon of older workers decreases the incentive to renovate the technology employed at their jobs.
We use a vintage model inspired from Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) . Beyond the heterogeneity arising from the age of the vintage, life cycle features are also considered. Following here Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez, and Rios-Rull (2003) and (Ljunqvist and Sargent 2008) , agents age stochastically. We assume that the population can be divided into 3 age groups: primeage workers, old workers and retirees. A firm hiring an old worker knows that he will go on 6 For an empirical study, see Aubert, Caroli, and Roger (2006) who analyze the effects of novel technologies on the French labor flows by age or the paper of Bartel and Sichermann (1993) working with US data.
retirement with a given probability and, similarly, a firm hiring a young worker interiorizes the fact that he will become old at a given probability. A match between the firm and the worker pursues as far as the associated surplus is positive.
We find that the acceleration in the rate of technological progress reduces the scrapping time of machines/workers (more job destruction). Besides, firms prefer, in principle, to update technologies associated to younger workers since they can smooth their investment during a larger period of time (young workers become old while occupying the same job). In the stationary equilibrium of the model, young workers' positions are situated at the technological frontier, or close to best technology, whereas old workers remain in technological obsolete jobs (this is coherent with the empirical findings of Abowd et al. (2007) , Ahituv and Zeira (2000) or Borghans and Weel (2002) ). Nevertheless, this result can be moderated if we distinguish between old workers having a relatively high productivity and those having a relatively low productivity. In this case, even if the working horizon is short, it is more interesting for the firm to train a high productivity worker rather than destroying the job and creating a new one (this corresponds to the estimations of ??? for the US economy and Behaghel and Greenan (2007) for the French economy).
Finally, the numerical simulations provided in section 6 reveal that, for reasonable parameter values, the capitalization effect overcomes the creative destruction effect for young workers. The situation is reversed when considering the old population. However, a puzzle arise: we are unable to reproduce the estimated elasticities of employment with respect to growth both in the young and the old segment. Concerning the elasticity of employment of prime age workers (young segment), we perform several sensitivity analysis. On the one hand, in order to increase the sensibility of employment with respect to growth, we reduce the value of the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment as well as the value of the workers' outside option. By increasing the expected profits of the firm, we stimulate the opening of new vacancies.
The probability to find a job increases and so does the number of employees. The elasticity of employment of prime age workers with respect to growth is then largely improved by simply reducing the two previous parameters.
The situation on the old segment is somewhat different. Because their working horizon is very short, most workers leave on retirement before an exogenous or an endogenous destruction shock can arrive. As a result, the effect of growth on the employment rate of old workers is very reduced, since growth does not have any impact on the exogenous probability of retirement, which constitutes the main factor responsible for the exits from employment in this sector. 2 The model
Assumptions
We build a matching model based in Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) where the economy is populated by a continuum of firms and workers. Each firm employs only one worker. Workers may be young or old. We will note X y all variables referred to young workers and X o those referred to old. The exogenous probability of becoming old is represented by λ y , so that workers remain young for a period equal to 1/λ y . Older workers go to retirement with probability λ o , therefore they are old during 1/λ o periods (see figure 2 ). In this stylized life cycle model, we assume that the risk to become a retiree is supported during a short duration time. We restrict then λ o and λ y such that λ o > λ y . The evolution of the total population of young and old workers is respectively given by:
where λ o P o stands for the fraction of old workers going to retirement and leaving thus the old workforce. Because the aggregate workforce is assumed to be constant, this proportion of old workers going to retirement must equal the entries into the young workforce. Similarly, λ y P y represents the exits from the young segment and the entries to the old one. Normalizing P y to one we obtain
At each moment of time a mass u i for i = y, o of unemployed workers and a mass v i for 
Under these assumptions and knowing that M (u i , v i ) represents the number of matches per unit of time, we can represent the probability of filling a vacancy as
Equivalently, the probability of finding a job is
Assuming that young and old workers have the same productivity, firms prefer young workers because they can produce for a longer period of time. The free entry condition ensures though that firms post vacancies for both types of workers. It is always in the interest of an old worker, to search in the young labor market segment since there are more job opportunities.
Nevertheless, we assume that old workers are not endowed with the required characteristics to become productive in a young worker position. That is, we are assuming that within the firm's organization all characteristics are not perfectly substitutable. For example, for a given productivity level, the organizational process of the firm may require more physical effort if the job is directed to a young worker and more experience if directed to a senior. Under these assumptions, the decentralized allocation with directed search is a stable equilibrium 7 . When directing the vacancy to a young worker the firm interiorizes though that the worker will become old with a probability λ y .
New jobs embody the most advanced known technology, however, once created, their productivity remains constant for the rest of their life. Job creation commits the firm to the technology available at the date. Independently on whether a vacancy is directed to a young or to an old worker, a firm without a worker advertises a job vacancy at a cost p(t)c per period, where p(t) = e gt is a common growth factor and g is the rate of productivity growth at the technological frontier (creation costs must grow at rate g to ensure the existence of a steady state with balanced growth). Across newly created jobs, match productivity grows thus at the exogenous 7 See Cheron, Hairault, and Langot (2007) for a complete discussion on the equilibrium instability with direct search when all the workers have the same characteristics. Because the outside option of employment increases in response to productivity growth at the technological frontier whereas the job's productivity remains constant, the surplus associated to a match is decreasing through time.
Once the job is created several situations may arise. First, the firm can continue to produce with the same technology embodied in the job at the creation date. Secondly, the firm may decide to pay a fixed renovation cost to update the technology and continue producing with the same worker. Finally, the firm may decide to close down and exit production because the job is not longer profitable. To keep our representation as close as possible to Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) we will also assume that jobs might be destroyed by an exogenous shock with probability δ.
The agents' behavior
An open vacancy can remain empty and searching or be filled and start producing. The associated asset value to each of these situations is represented by V i (t) for i = y, o if the vacancy is empty at current date t. J i (τ, t) for i = y, o stands for the value of an existing job at date t which was created at time τ . Similarly, the value of employment in a job at date t which was created at time τ is represented by W i (τ, t) for i = y, whereas the value of unemployment search at date t is given by U (t). We first consider the case where the renovation cost is so high that the firm waits for obsolescence rather than ever updating the technology.
The firms
When the firm opens a vacancy at date t it supports a cost p(t)c, whatever the type of worker, young or old, required to fill the vacancy. There is then a probability 1 − q(θ i ) for i = y, o that the vacancy remains empty next period. On the opposite, there is a probability q(θ i ) for i = y, o that the vacancy gets filled. The asset value associated to a searching vacancy is then:
In the equilibrium the firm opens vacancies until all rents are exhausted, i.e. V i (t) = 0. Market tightness at date t satisfies then:
Even though we do not assume productivity differentials between young and old workers, the asset value at date t of a job filled at date τ varies depending on whether the job is directed to a young or to an old worker. In the former case, if at date τ the worker filling the vacancy is young, the firm interiorizes the fact that the worker horizon before retirement is longer than if the job is occupied by an old worker.
The asset values associated to a job filled by a young worker and by an old worker are respectively given by:
where w i (τ, t) for i = y, o stands for the wage paid at date t in a job created at date τ . When the worker is old the asset value of the filled vacancy must take into account for the fact that the worker will go on retirement with probability λ o . Then, for the older workers, aging implies that the continuation value is equal to zero. At the opposite, for the young worker, aging leads to a strictly positive continuation value (J y (τ, t)).
The workers
An unemployed worker receives a flow of earnings p(t)b including unemployment benefits, leisure, domestic productivity, etc. and increasing with the productivity growth at the technology frontier. A young job seeker comes in contact with a vacant slot at rate p(θ y ) = θ y q(θ y ) and becomes old with probability λ y . Old job seekers enter in contact with a vacancy at rate p(θ o ) = θ o q(θ o ) and they quit the labor market with probability λ o . The asset value of unemployment to both types workers is respectively given by:
At date t, a job created at τ and filled with a young worker has a productivity p(τ )x and pays a wage w y (τ, t) to the worker. If the job is filled with an old worker, the productivity also equals p(τ )x and we denote the wage as w o (τ, t). The present value of a young and an old workers solve:
Notice that we assume that the asset value corresponding to the retirement period is equal to zero. Without choice of the retirement age and heterogeneity between retirement value between unemployed and employed workers, this simplification does not change the results presented in the paper.
The wage bargaining process
Since search and hiring activities are costly, when a match is formed a joint surplus is generated.
The traditional approach in this literature is to consider that, at the beginning of every period the firm and the employee negotiate wages through a Nash bargaining process, that splits the joint surplus into fixed proportions at all times:
∀i = y, o, where η (0, 1) is the bargaining power of workers. Replacing equations (3), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) and (10) in expression (11), and applying then one of the sharing rules (either (12) or (13)) leads to the following wage:
The wage equals a weighted average of the worker's productivity on her current job and the flow value of her outside options, since ω(θ i ) = (b + η 1−η cθ i ) represents the worker's reservation wage (the flow value of the worker's job search option). One of the main drawbacks of this specification, is that, it makes wages dependent on the labor market conditions θ 8 .
Because wages display a stickiness, recent works by Pissarides (2007a) or Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) , adopt rather the rigid wage definition proposed by Hall and Milgrom (2008) . The idea behind the wage determination process proposed by these authors is the following: we suppose that the worker receives a payoff p(t)b in case negotiation breaks down but also when the agreement is delayed. For the firm, we assume that there is no cost while bargaining continues.
Firms and workers renegotiate the division of the match product p(τ )x, so that the outcome of the symetric alternating-offers game is :
The central result of this bargaining process is that the real wage does not depend on the labor market tightness. Then, the real wage is rigid.
3 Creative job destruction: why does growth does not discriminate against old workers?
We assume wages to be independent from the labor market tightness (they are rigid) However, to test the robustness of the results, we will systematically compare our predictions to those obtained under the hypothesis of flexible wages (developed in the appendix).
When the firm hires a young (an old) worker, she knows that the worker will become old (go on retirement) with probability λ y (λ o ). Therefore, when actualizing the flow of future profits generated by the job, she interiorizes this probability.
where the wage is given by (15).
Given a stationary time path for future labor market tightness, we conjecture that the value of a new job is proportional to productivity on the technology frontier, i.e.
Replacing in the previous expression when τ = t = 0 confirms this conjecture and yields our job destruction rule:
Replacing J i (t, t) = p(t)J in the free entry condition (4) permits to confirm that the labor market tightness is stationary, for i = y, o:
where we refer to this expression as the job creation rule.
The job destruction curve is an horizontal line in the space (θ i , J i ) whereas the job creation curve is positively sloped, determining a unique intersection point (θ * i , J * i ) that stands for the equilibrium in segment i = y, o. Evidently, to be economically meaningful these equilibrium values should be positive, which requires b and c to be sufficiently small.
Property 1a
The equilibrium optimal age of job destruction does not depend on the age of the workers when wages are rigid.
Proof The equilibrium optimal age of job destruction, is the solution to the problems defined on the right hand side of equations (18) and (19):
Equations (21) and (22) 
showing that the scrapping time does not depend on the age of the workers.
Replacing (23) in the job destruction curves permits to obtain the relationship between J * i and
because J o (0, T * ) = 0 at the equilibrium.
Property 1b
The equilibrium value of a young worker job is higher than the equilibrium value of an old worker job. This implies that the hiring rate for young workers is higher than the senior's hiring rate.
Proof Equations (24) and (25) When wages are flexible, the equilibrium optimal ages of job destruction are given by:
where Proof See appendix 8.
In summary, the equilibrium in the labor market is characterized by a larger creation rate of young positions than of senior positions, independently on the hypothesis made on the wage determination process. Concerning the endogenous destruction rate, results differ depending on the way wages are determined. In the presence of rigid wages, the age of workers does not introduce any heterogeneity since the deterministic wage growth is shared by the two populations.
Then, given the particular vintage of a technology introduced at date τ , the waiting time for obsolescence is the same for young and old workers. In contrast, if wages are flexible, the scrapping time differs between both workers categories, young workers having a shorter scrapping horizon. Proof Concerning (i), the impact on the scrapping time is negative (see equation (23)): the direct effect of g on T * tends to reduce the optimal time the firm keeps a technology. Indeed, an acceleration in the pace of technological progress leads the firm to destroy jobs more often in order to adopt the new technology. Then we deduce that ∂T * ∂g < 0. Concerning (ii), in none of the segments the job creation curve is affected. The only observed shift in the (θ, J) space (for a constant scrapping time) corresponds to the job destruction curve which moves downwards:
Property 2a
• In the old segment:
• In the young segment:
Because faster growth shifts down the horizontal job destruction curves and does not affect the positive relation between θ i and J i defined by the job creation curves, both the equilibrium value of the match surplus and the labor market tightness decline with growth, i.e.
∂J i
∂g < 0 and
Part (iii) can be deduced from (28) and (29). Indeed, at the limit, we have λ y = λ o : in this case,
As proved in the appendix these results remain robust when considering flexible wages.
In property 1b, we showed that, at the equilibrium, the hiring rate for young workers was larger than that of old workers, J * y > J * o . Property 2a suggests that an increase in the growth rate of technical progress decreases the comparative advantage of young workers. Indeed, a higher growth rate fosters a higher labor cost for a longer period of time if the employee is young than if the employee is old. Can we then deduce that growth discriminates against young workers?
This result would be completely counterfactual. We can then conclude again that we are not taking into account an impact mechanism: the creative destruction process is not able by its own to explain the link between growth and unemployment.
4 Renovation: why firms prefer to fire old workers?
We introduce now the possibility for the firm to renovate its technology: the firm pays a fix cost giving access to the best possible technology. This assumption leads to less caricatural results:
with renovation, the creative-destruction process is not the only link between employment and growth. By introducing the possibility of updating, we allow firms to increase their expected profits by incorporating new technologies: if renovation costs are low, one can expect that the "capitalization" effect overstates the "creative-destruction" process. Does this hold for all age categories? More precisely, is the updating decision related to age?
The possibility of updating a technology at date t is possible after incurring in a fixed cost p(t)I that allows the firm to increase the value of a job from J R i (τ, t) to J R i (t, t) for i = y, o. Under a fixed renovation cost, the firm that chooses to renovate always moves to the current technology frontier. This renovation cost stands for the sum of both the costs of new equipment and the costs of training.
In this new framework, a job can then be destroyed by an exogenous shock, by an endogenous decision of the firm (if the relation becomes not profitable) or the technology of the job may be updated if the firm pays a fixed renovation cost p(t)I (rather than destroying the job and creating a new one it may be more profitable for the firm to renovate). Evidently, renovation takes place if and only if the renovation horizon T R i for i = y, o is smaller than the destruction horizon (T R i < T * i for i = y, o). When renovation occurs, the firm pays an implementation cost p(τ +T R i )I for i = y, o in order to rise the value of the job from
The value of a filled job when renovation is possible is given by:
for a senior, and
for a young worker.
As J R i (t, t) = p(t)J R i , when τ = t = 0 we obtain:
These new job destruction curves remain horizontal lines in the (θ R i , J R i ) space for i = y, o, whereas we have the same positive sloped job creation curves defined in equation (20), leading to a unique labor market equilibrium (θ R * i , J R * i ) for i = y, o. The optimal choice of the renovation horizon is obtained solving the right hand side problem of equations (31) and (32):
Replacing in equation (31) and (32) yields the optimal date at which the firm decides to renovate:
Property 3a The optimal date at which the firm decides to renovate a position occupied by an old worker 9 (T R * o ) is an increasing function of the fixed renovation cost (I) and the probability that the worker becomes a retiree (λ 0 ). At the opposite, T R * o decreases with the growth rate of technical progress (g). Proof See equation (35). This result remains robust in the presence of flexible wages (see appendix 8).
It is in the interest of the firm to renovate if and only if the renovation cost is lower than the optimal value she obtains without renovation:
Because J * y > J * o (given the equality in the obsolescence age), the firm may face a situation where the updating cost I is such that J * y > I > J * o . That is, it is in the interest of the firm to 9 The optimal date at which the firm decides to renovate a position occupied by a young worker (T R * y ) is an increasing function of the fixed renovation cost (I) and of the probability that the worker becomes a retiree.
At the opposite, T R * y decreases with the growth rate of technical progress (g). See equation (36), given that
update only if the worker is young. For old workers it is not profitable to renovate and the firm prefers to fire the worker and open a new vacancy 10 .
However, the firm can also face a situation where it is in her interest to update jobs occupied by young and old workers, i.e. J * y > J * o > I. In this case, does technical progress help old workers? Not necessarily, because the impact of an acceleration in g is ambiguous 11 . If the implementation cost is closed to zero, we have a pure "capitalization" effect: the destruction is reduced to its exogenous component and the technology is renovated continuously as in the Solow model. If the renovation cost ais large, the renovation strategy is dominated: the pure "creative-destruction" process is at work. Between these two extremes cases, there is a unique critical up-dating cost such that the creative destruction effect offsets the capitalization effect.
Then, if I is lower (higher) than this threshold value of the renovation cost, faster growth leads to more (less) job creation: the capitalization (creative-destruction) effect dominates.
The predominance of the capitalization effect when I becomes very small, can be interpreted in two ways. First, we can focus on the specific abilities of the workers. If the skills of an old worker are close to the abilities required by new jobs, the training cost is low and then the renovation strategy is optimal. At the opposite, if the gap between the worker's skills and the abilities required by the firm is large, the renovation cost is high: the optimal strategy is to fire the worker because search costs are lower than training costs 12 . Second, we can focus on the sector specific investment costs. In sectors where the cost of new equipment is low, the probability to renovate a job occupied by an old worker is higher than in sectors where the investment cost is high 13 . If we introduce match-heterogeneity in our basic model, we find that the renovation shown in the appendix, in this situation it may be in the interest of the firm to update positions occupied by old qualified workers.
11 The ambiguity of the the impact g on the job creation appear in in both an economy with rigid wages and in an economy with flexible wages. 12 This finding is confirmed when working with the French Complementary Survey on Training 2001. When we consider workers above 50 years old, specific human capital investment paid by firms is biased in favor of some types of occupations, referred as "high productivity occupations". Around 44% of managers (38% of technicians) between 51 and 55 years old and 34% of those (21% of technicians) between 56 and 60 years old receives training paid by the firm in case of technological change. When considering employees, these percentages are reduced to 21% and 9%, and to 13% and 8% for manual workers. In spite of their shorter working horizon, firms continue to invest in managers and technicians specific human capital (rather than in employees' and manual workers' one),
suggesting that productivity gains obtained by updating their skills manage to compensate the training cost. 13 Again, this result is clearly observed in the French data for the period 1996-2004, where we estimate that the strategy and the optimal scrapping time depend on a match-specific productivity component (see the appendix). This extension of our basic set-up allows to account for the observed large
heterogeneity measured with micro-data.
What about the impact of the retirement age? Does a low retirement age discriminate against old workers? As the optimal renovation date increases with the probability of retirement,
∂T R * o /∂λ 0 > 0, we are less likely to find T R * o < T * when the impending retirement age is low. Indeed, for a high probability of retirement, λ o , the horizon of the worker is shorter. The probability to recoup the renovation cost is then lower than in an economy characterized by a higher retirement age (low λ o ). Furthermore since ∂J * o /∂λ o < 0 the renovation condition I ≤ J * o becomes also less likely. The increase in λ o reduces then the probability of updating 14 . Then, a short horizon before the retirement age leads to large weight of the creative-destruction effect.
The young and old unemployment rates
At the steady state, we must find that, in each of the two labor market segments (young and old), job creation flows must equal job destruction flows. In the economy, jobs are destroyed either because they experience an exogenous job destruction shock or because they reach the age of obsolescence. When considering the young segment we will also have to take into account the flows of entry into unemployment coming from "new born". And when focusing on the old segment we will have to consider the entries to unemployment coming from the young segment.
Let us first consider the exits and entries to unemployment in the young segment. The formers correspond to the rate at which workers are matched with jobs plus the fraction of unemployed young workers becoming old, that is: OU T y = p(θ y )u y + λ y u y . Entries to unemployment come from new born, λ o P o , exogenous job destruction, δ(P y −u y ) and from the fraction of job creation that survives in the same age-class (young) to exogenous destruction, p(θ y )u y e −(δ+λ y )T * . Then,
At the steady state entries and exits average share of exits for workers aged above 50 is almost 23% per year in the industry whereas in the service sector it falls to 13%. 14 This effect is less clear in the presence of flexible wages, since the increase in the optimal renovation date is also associated to the increase in the scrapping time, so at the end we might have T
R * o
≷ T * o . Because wages are flexible, we might find that the fall in wages is sufficiently important to induce a rise in the scrapping time such that the final updating horizon T R * o remains lower than T * o . In this case it will be in the interest of the firm to update rather than to destroy the job (under the assumption that I < J * o ), in spite of the increased probability of retirement. from unemployment are equalized, leading to the following equilibrium young unemployment rate (because the young work force is normalized to one, u y stands now for a rate):
Then, the employment rate of the young worker is n y = 1 − u y .
The reasoning is fairly similar for the old segment. The flows out from unemployment are 
Then, the employment rate of the old worker is
When all jobs are updated, the only source of destruction is the exogenous shock represented by δ, so that the young and old unemployment rates are respectively given by u y = δ+λy δ+λ y +p(θ y ) 15 The term λ y δ+λy uyp(θy)e −(δ+λy )T * stands for those young employed worker that become old and loose their job endogenously. At each time t, the flow of young workers employed in a vintage τ becoming old is defined by:
The dynamic of employment of the old workers is given bẏ
No(t) = −(δ + λo)No(t)
Exo. des.
− No(t − To, t)
Endo. des.
λyuy(τ, t)p(θy(τ, t))exp(−(δ + λy)τ )dτ
At steady state, we have uy(τ, t) = uy and p(θy(τ, t)) = p(θy). Then, we have (θo) . Finally, note that if the creative-destruction effect dominates in the old labor segment, there are some endogenous destructions, increasing with the TFP growth rate since ∂T * /∂g < 0 There will also be less job creations, ∂θ o /∂g < 0. This is however not sufficient to insure that ∂u o /∂g > 0. If the capitalization effect dominates in the young labor market segment, there is a mechanical effect coming from the fact that young unemployed worker become old. Therefore, if unemployment decreases in the young segment, it will also fall in the old segment. Then, the impact of growth on the employment rate of the older workers remains ambiguous.
Numerical Simulations
The theoretical analysis shows that there is an equilibrium such that an acceleration of the TFP growth can improve the employment rate of the prime-age workers, and simultaneously, discriminate against older workers. This equilibrium is in accordance with the stylized facts.
Nevertheless, for all equilibrium configurations, two contradictory effects arise when growth accelerates. On the one hand, faster growth decreases more rapidly the profits and then accelerates the "creative-destruction process". On the other hand, faster growth yields a higher expected surplus after renovation occurs, reducing the implementation horizon. Then, even if the capitalization effect dominates in the young labor market segment, the presence of the creative destruction effect moderates the impact of growth on the equilibrium employment rate. In this section, we propose numerical experiments in order to test the ability of model to reproduce the elasticities estimated in the introduction. These experiments contribute then to enrich the discussion on the capacity of the matching model to explain the impact of productivity changes on the employment rate 16 . We only report the outcome of computational experiments for the rigid wage case. Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) 's paper shows that this assumption allows to improve the elasticity of the employment rate with respect to the TFP growth rate. Interest rate r = .04
Matching elasticity α = .5
Recruiting cost c/q(θ y ) = .35
Exogenous separation rate δ = .032
Bargaining power η = .5
Outside option b = .4
Young age duration 1/λ y = 36 years
Old age duration 1/λ o = 4 years summarized in the table 2. Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) fix the exogenous job destruction rate, δ, according to the values provided in tables 2.1 and 2.1 of Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) for the period 1973-1988. Our calibration will differ from that used in Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) . Instead of using US data, we employ the estimations provided by Gomez-Salvador, Messina, and Vallanti (2004) for France for the period going from 1992 to 2000. The estimated annual job destruction rates linked to exits from the manufacturing sector are equal to 3.2%, implying that the life expectancy of an establishment is at least 31 years.
The outside option b = .4 is chosen on the basis of the estimations made by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) for France.
Given this set of parameters, we choose the implementation cost I and the scale parameter of the matching function φ, such that we match both the employment rate and the unemployment duration of an European type economy. Our numerical simulations display, for an annual TFP growth rate equal to 2%, an equilibrium employment rate around 90% for the 25-54 years old workers (young workers) and an unemployment duration of 1.8 years. For 55-64 years old workers the employment rate equals 39% and the unemployment duration is six years 17 . Our estimation of the job and the scale parameter of the matching function equals 0.25 and the renovation cost 17 In order to compute an employment rate for the 55-64 years old workers, we assume that the retirement age is equal to 60, as in the French economy. Then, the employment rate of the 55-59 years old workers is strictly positive. At the opposite, the employment rate for the 60-64 years old workers is equal to zero. The employment rate of the 55-64 years old workers is then computed as the weighed average of these employment rates.
is 60% of the productivity. workers. This simply results from the rise in the employment opportunities in the young segment and the decrease in the employment opportunities of the old segment. The capitalization effect is then dominant in the young market whereas the creative destruction dominates in the old market. Secondly, it is in the interest of the firms to renovate positions occupied by young and old workers (T i > T R i ∀i = y, o) 18 . However, the optimal renovation horizon is 13.49 years for the young workers and 27.62 years for the old workers. Given the short working horizon of old workers (the expected time duration for a job occupied by an old worker is 4 years) these jobs are certain to have ended before the renovation date. In contrast, young workers can take advantage of the economic growth since their working horizon equals 36 years. Finally, table 3 shows that an increase of one percentage point in the growth rate increases the employment rate of prime workers by 0.143 percentage points and decreases that of old workers by 0.016, which remains far away from the empirical estimations provided in table 1. The low elasticity of the old-worker employment rate is due to the large impact of the horizon effect: the impact of the endogenous job destruction flows on the employment rate is small because (i) the proportion of the 55-59 age-group in the total population of 55-64 years old workers is one half, and (ii) there is a positive effect coming from the young labor segment where the employment rate increases.
Similarly to Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) or Shimer (2005) , we can try to "play" with the parameters so as to increase the elasticity of employment with respect to growth or to productivity shocks. In order to have realistic results we focus on the parameter 19 , α, for which there exists an extensive literature adopting quite different values (see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for 18 As in Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) , the calculated scrapping times are very high, above 45 years for g = 2% and above 30 years for g = 3%
19 In Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) the authors find that, in order to reproduce the estimated elasticity of unemployment with respect to growth, r + δ should equal 0.05. However, this implies adopting completely a synthesis). Let us now analyze the impact of an early retirement policy. We suppose that the working horizon of an old worker is reduced to two years. As observed in table 5 this yields a sharp drop in the employment rate of old workers to 18%. With this new calibration of the expected time horizon of old workers, it is not in the interest of the firm to renovate positions occupied by old workers, that is, the scrapping horizon is below the implementation horizon. Both horizons are though too high with respect to the short working horizon of these workers. Most of the exits from employment comme now from the retirement decision. Actually, we realize that an increase in one percentage point in the TFP growth decreases the employment rate by 1.83 percentage points, which constitutes a sizeable elasticity. This large variation of the employment rate is mainly explained by the creation side since the scrapping time remains too high to significantly affect the destruction flows.
unrealistic values for r or for δ. 
Conclusions
Recent studies on the link between growth and unemployment conclude on the existence of a negative relationship between both variables, suggesting that, in case of acceleration in the growth rate, the capitalization effect dominates the creative destruction effect (see Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) , Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) or Tripier (2007) ). However, one of the main drawbacks of these studies is that, by considering homogeneous agents, they are ignoring the heterogenous effects growth may have on different population segments. This paper analyzes the effects of growth on employment along the life cycle, and more precisely, the effects of growth on the employment rate of old workers.
We then present some empirical facts showing that the link between economic growth and the employment rate is age-dependant. In OECD countries, economic growth discriminates against older worker, whereas an acceleration of the growth leads to more employment for prime-age workers. In order to explain these empirical results, we develop a vintage model inspired in Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) but distinguishing between young and old workers.
The introduction of life-cycle features introduces a comparative advantage for young workers:
when a worker is young, the time horizon during which a firm can recoup the updating cost allowing to renovate an existing technology is longer than for a senior. Then, the firm renovates jobs occupied by young workers whereas separation is the best strategy if the job is occupied by an old worker. An equilibrium in accordance with the estimated facts is then characterized by a larger (lower) impact of the capitalization effect than the creative destruction effect in the young (old) labor market segment. Contrarily to Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) , our results suggest that the creative destruction effect is a useful concept in order to explain the link between economic growth and the employment rate by age class.
Our computational experiments confirm this theoretical result. However, even if for realistic parameter values, we manage to reproduce the positive relationship between growth and the employment rate of young workers and the negative relationship between growth and the employment rate of old workers, the simulated elasticities remain far away from their empirical counterparts. Several sensitivity analysis are then performed.
8 Appendix. Robustness : the wage bargaining
The equilibrium with wage bargaining
Given the wage equation (14) and knowing that the value of a new job is proportional to productivity on the technology frontier, (i.e. J i (t, t) = p(t)J), ∀i = y, o, job destruction rules are given by:
As in the wage posting case, the job creation rule is given by (20).
The equilibrium optimal ages of job destruction, are the solution to the problems defined on the right hand side of equations (39) and (40):
where • In the old segment:
The new equilibrium in each of the segments is characterized by lower values of J * i and θ * i for i = y, o, implying a fall in the hiring rates.
Part (ii) can be deduced from (45) and (46). Indeed, at the limit, we have λ y = λ o : in this case,
We start the proof of part (iii) with the analysis of the old segment. The equilibrium asset value of a job occupied by an old worker is given by:
It is easy to show that the right hand side of the previous equation is increasing in g and T * o . At the same time, we have just found that the job destruction curve of the old segment shifts down when g increases, leading to a reduction in the equilibrium value J * o (since the job creation curve is not affected by g). Because an increase in the growth rate fosters a reduction in J * o , and because we know that the right hand side of (43) is increasing in g and T * o , then T * o must necessarily decrease in order to induce the reduction in the equilibrium value J * o . Therefore
Concerning the young segment, the equilibrium asset value of a job is given by:
As previously, we can show that the right hand side of the equation is increasing 20 in g and T * y . Because the job destruction curve of the young segment shifts down when g increases, leading to a reduction in the equilibrium value J * y , and because we know that the right hand side of (44) is increasing in g and T * y , then T * y must necessarily decrease in order to induce the reduction in the equilibrium value J * y . Therefore
20 Because s < T * y we find: The values of a job filled in the old and the young segments when renovation is possible are respectively given by:
with
The optimal choices of the renovation horizon are obtained solving the right hand side problem of equations (47) and (48):
Replacing in equations (47) and (48) 
for the old workers and for the young workers.
Property 3b
The renovation horizon for old workers (T R o ) increases with the updating cost and the probability of retirement, whereas it decreases in case of acceleration in the pace of growth 21 .
Proof See equation (51).
A low retirement age discriminates against old workers, since updating will become less probable for two reasons. First, the expected value of a job filled by an old worker (J * o ) falls, making less likely the probability to update (the inequality I < J * o is less likely to hold). Second, in spite of the rise in the scrapping time associated to old positions fostered by the rise in λ o , the optimal renovation horizon increases too. As a result we may find
An acceleration in the rate of technological progress reduces the optimal renovation horizon as well as the optimal scrapping time. Simultaneously, the expected value of the job falls, so that we are less likely to find I < J * o . Renovation becomes therefore less probable.
9 Appendix. Match heterogeneity and aging: why some old workers are retrained?
Evidently, it seems counterintuitive to claim that no one in the old segment benefits from technological updating. Furthermore, working with the French Complementary Survey on Training, we find that around 44% of managers (38% of technicians) between 51 and 55 years old and 34%
of those (21% of technicians) between 56 and 60 years old receives training paid by the firm in case of technological change. Why firms train some old workers if their working horizon is short?
Under which conditions this capitalization effect (renovation of an already existing technology) overcomes the creative destruction effect (destruction of an already existing old job) in the older workers' case? This appendix aims at providing an answer to these questions.
We now introduce in the model a random idiosyncratic component in the productivity which becomes x . is distributed according to a cumulative function F ( ) and its value is revealed once the worker and the firm meet.
Without renovation opportunity and in the presence of rigid wages, the destruction age of a job equals T * ( ) = increases with the productivity level). Indeed a good match is a scarce resource that the firm tries to preserve: renovation insures that the quality of the match is maintained. Conversely, for every new match the firm must draw a new match-specific productivity. This last option, implying lay offs, is preferred by the firm when its actual is low 25 .
Firms renovate only positions having a match-specific productivity greater than a critical value R i solving 26 :
Jobs having a productivity level above R o constitute the set of renovated matches. Because When g accelerates there is a reduction in both the renovation horizon and the scrapping time.
Independently on the wage determination process we can distinguish among three possible situations. For realistic parameter values, our numerical simulations show 27 , that the reduction in the renovation horizon fostered by the rise in g is more important than that of the scrapping time. Consequently, the reservation productivity R o increases in order to reestablish the equality situation, corresponds the case where the reduction the renovation and the scrapping horizon is such that the equality T R * o (R o ) = T * (R o ) directly holds. R o remains thus unchanged and the set of renovated jobs does not vary neither. Thirdly, if the acceleration in the pace of technological progress yields a more important reduction of the scrapping time, the reservation productivity R o decreases, fostering a rise in the set of renovated jobs.
